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1 Introducing Inflation Targeting
In December 1997, the CNB announced that
it would switch to inflation targeting. After eight
years of relying on intermediate targets, this
represented an historic change in the strategy of
monetary policy. It is worth noting that price stability
has always been the ultimate target of Czech
monetary policy.
However, there were different strategies
applied to reaching this long-term target. In the
framework of inflation targeting, the inflation targets
have been explicitly specified in terms of net inflation
derived from CPI inflation for two time horizons: net
inflation to be 6% ±0.5% by the end of 1998 and
4.5% ±1% by the end of the year 2000.












































































































































Note:  The historical series of net inflation was calculated backwards in 1997 for the purposes of inflation
targeting by the Czech Statistical Office for the period of 1995–1997. The CNB expects that net
inflation will be close to the lower edge of the targeted interval by the end of 1998.20
1.1 A Short History
The stability of the Czech koruna has been
the ultimate monetary policy target of the CNB
according to bank law since the very beginning of the
bank’s existence
2. In 1993, the Czech Republic had
reached the halfway mark in the transitional process
and in the process of disinflation. As a consequence, it
was necessary to derive the strategy of monetary
policy from some concept of medium-term stability.
During 1993–1997, before switching to inflation
targeting, the CNB had used three strategies. All three
were based on working with intermediate targets and
were to a significant extent affected by the transitional
process.
                                                
2 As a consequence of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia,
the Czech National Bank was established on January 1,
1993 and became the successor to the State Bank of
Czechoslovakia.
For example, instruments were being
changed quite often as financial markets progressed
from an embryonic stage of development to more
advanced stages.
The first strategy was used in 1993–1995.
The koruna was pegged to a basket of currencies, and
the money supply was used as a complementary
intermediate target. Each year, the targeted interval
was announced for money supply annual growth
together with a forecast of CPI inflation that was
projected in accordance with both intermediate
targets. Table 1 shows that in these years, the CNB
was aiming at slow disinflation.
Table 1. Targets and Inflation Forecasts: 1993–1997
Forecast of
CPI Inflation





































Note: The overview of intermediate, operational targets/instruments and inflation forecasts is based on Annual Reports by
the CNB and the annual monetary documents prepared for each year in December of the previous year. Although some
targets were modified during the year, we do not report the modifications here for the sake of simplicity. For example, in
1994 due to capital inflow, the target for money supply growth was modified upwards, but the growth exceeded the upper
limit. The actual values of respective variables are in parentheses. The actual CPI inflation deviated from the forecast in
two periods when monetary policy decisions were subject to transitional uncertainty. In 1993, the VAT reform was an
exogenous shock with the impact on CPI inflation higher than anticipated. In 1997, exchange rate turbulence and
subsequent exchange rate depreciation were the causes of deviation.21
In the first years of transition, the pegged
exchange rate provided a nominal anchor for the
Czech economy and was a key intermediate target for
the CNB. Due to the low degree of koruna
convertibility, it was possible to work with the money
supply as well. This complementary intermediate
target was important since due to embryonic financial
markets, the only available operational targets were
quantitative ones. Also, the target for money supply
had its important signalling role, because the credit
limits were characteristic features of the previous
stages of transition.
In the period of 1993–1995, two operational
targets were used simultaneously (monetary base, free
reserves), and these targets were compatible with
money supply targeting. The main reason for working
with volume targets was that the financial markets
were in an embryonic stage of development and were
too thin to give reliable information on prices. In
1995, when markets became more advanced, the
combined operational target was used for free
reserves with the over-writing rule for maximum
value of the short-term money market rate. The
strategy of monetary policy was changed for the first
time in 1996. As a response to large capital inflows,
financial market developments and liberalisation of
capital account transactions, the relative importance
of intermediate targets was altered. The koruna was
still pegged to a basket, but bands were much wider,
and intervention on the foreign exchange market
became rare. The target for money supply growth
gained significance due to increased autonomy.
Graphs 2 and 3 demonstrate the switch in importance
of the two intermediate targets.






































































































































Note: Annual growth of M2 (in %) is compared to announced intervals for the end of each year in 1993–1997.22
The general framework of monetary policy
remained the same. For each year, the targeted
interval was announced for money supply annual
growth together with a forecast of CPI inflation that
was projected in accordance with both intermediate
targets (See Table 1). Similarly to the period of 1993–
1995, the choice of operational targets was mainly
determined by the stage of financial market
development. In 1996, the short-term rates became an
operational target of monetary policy with the repo
rate being the instrument.

















































































































































Index Indicator of FX Interventions
Note: On the left axis, the exchange rate bands and index are scaled. The bands were abandoned in May 1997.
The indicator of foreign exchange rate intervention is scaled on the right axis (billion koruna).
The second change in the strategy of
monetary policy before introducing inflation targeting
came in May 1997. After exchange rate turbulence
3,
the CNB let the koruna float. Hence, the second half
of 1997 was a period of “pure” monetary targeting
since the target for growth of M2 was not modified
                                                
3 For more information on the May exchange rate
turbulence, see the special working paper “Koruna
Exchange Rate Turbulence in May 1997“ Šmídková,
Kateřina et al. We can mention briefly here the main
reasons for the turbulence. There were growing internal and
external imbalances. Although monetary restriction in mid-
1996 was quite significant, it was not sufficiently backed by
corresponding fiscal and wage policies. In May, various
impulses such as the Asian crisis and domestic political
instability triggered an attack on the koruna that was
followed by resident panic. After a few days of defending
the bands, the CNB and the government let the koruna float.
and had been reached by the end of the year (See
Graph 2). The short-term rates remained the
operational target for monetary policy although three
months after the attack on the koruna, interest rate
levels were predetermined by the strategy of landing.
1.2 Reasons for Introducing the New Strategy
The Bank Board’s decision to switch to
inflation targeting, announced on December 21, 1997,
was the result of an intensive program of studies and
discussions within the bank. This program was
launched with the aim of overcoming ambiguity in the
focus of monetary policy since the discontinuation of
the pegged exchange rate regime and the shift to23
managed floating at the end of May 1997 left the
central bank without a transparent nominal anchor for
its policy. Arguments in favour of the adopted
decision are explained in the following paragraphs.
Firstly, the key issue has become the challenge of
securing effective control over the formation of
inflation expectations. Though the Czech Republic
was the first transition economy in the region to
achieve one-digit inflation in terms of CPI in 1994,
some inflation inertia prevailed, and CPI inflation has
fluctuated around 9 – 10% since then. Moreover, in
late 1997 a new inflation episode had begun to
develop. The outlook for the first months of 1998
signalled the acceleration of inflation well above one-
digit levels for the first time since 1994.
In the aftermath of exchange rate turbulence,
not only did the economy lose its nominal exchange
rate anchor of the past eight years, but the experience
suggested that the previous strategies were not
effective enough to reduce inflation expectations in
the changing conditions of the successive transitional
stages. In particular, the wage negotiations continued
to be based on a double-digit assumption
4 despite the
fact that the koruna was pegged to the basket of DEM
and USD with no change in central parity up until
May 1997. The parallel intermediary target, the
money supply in terms of M2, was also met in 1997.
The conclusion followed that those frameworks were
not capable nor credible enough to affect the
expectations, and therefore, could not secure the
continuation of the disinflation process.
The strategy of inflation targeting offered an
attractive alternative. Unlike previous non-binding
annual forecasts, inflation targeting implies the
unambiguous declaration of the disinflationary path
and explicit quantitative targets of the disinflation
process as a public commitment of the CNB.
Disinflation became not only a prime objective, but
                                                
4 In 1993, growth of average nominal wage was 25%, in
1994 17%, 1995 18%, 1996 14% and 1997 12%.
also a direct objective of monetary policy.
Accordingly, economic agents were provided with a
new medium-term nominal anchor on which they
could base their expectations and decision-making
processes. This new nominal anchor also supplied
economic agents with a longer time horizon than
annual forecasts. Moreover, given the solid reputation
of the CNB and its independence, this anchor was
likely to be more credible than the previous forecasts.
Secondly, the intermediary targets, i.e. the
pegged exchange rate and monetary aggregates
showed increased inconsistency with the underlying
conditions of an advanced stage of financial openness.
In its relatively flexible version of a horizontal band
of ±7.5%, though, the pegged exchange rate regime
proved to be non-sustainable and lost credibility
during the exchange rate turbulence in May 1997. The
option to reintroduce this peg seemed therefore
entirely unfeasible, especially due to two features: (i)
the open capital account and liberalised financial
markets made massive capital flows possible (both
inflows and outflows) which started to dominate
exchange rate developments especially in the short
run, and (ii) the process of relative price adjustments
especially in the segment of still administered prices,
such as energy prices for households, rents, transport
tariffs and utility prices, was targeted to continue in
the forthcoming period.
  Accordingly, the option of importing low
inflation from abroad via the pegged exchange rate
regime could not be expected to be sustainable. The
risk of large external imbalances parallel to the
developments of 1996 and 1997 would be rather high.
The managed float alternative, on the other hand,
provided for the flexibility of timely, smooth
corrections. In the case of increasing major
imbalances, the exchange rate movements would
signal inconsistency in the policies. The flexible
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character of the exchange rate arrangement was
necessary in a regime of inflation targeting.
As for monetary aggregates and the monetary
transmission mechanism, the previous experience had
revealed some limitations and weaknesses. The links
between money supply (M2) and price developments
(CPI inflation) as well as between the intermediate
target (M2) and controlled interest rates (REPO rates)
did not prove to be predictable nor sufficiently stable.
In addition to the constraints observed elsewhere, the
conditions of an economy in transition made their
application even less reliable. This was due, in
particular, to (i) a sequence of price shocks related to
transition (corrections of administered prices, tax
reforms) which distorted the link between the money
supply and price developments, (ii) the institutional
features of financial markets going through profound
changes within a relatively short time span. This
refers also to the operational targets and instruments
of monetary policy. In principle, monetary
transmission switched from quantities to prices, and
(iii) the emergence of new financial assets, as well as
new types of transactions and new market players
making the demand for money function very unstable.
The behaviour of commercial banks, for example, was
subject to far-reaching changes in their regulation, in
the impact of privatisation as well as in the
macroeconomic environment.
Consequently, monetary targeting itself
could hardly secure a reliable basis for the medium-
term disinflation strategy. Inflation targeting, on the
other hand, provided a framework integrating a
number of relevant economic indicators (including
money supply as an important one). The common
focus and the organising criterion for their assessment
contributed to the final goal of disinflation.
Thirdly, inflation targeting has provided a
scheme for filtering out exogenous price shocks from
“standard” inflationary pressures. The adopted
concept of net inflation excluded regulated or
administered prices as well as the effects of indirect
taxes on the prices of the remaining goods and
services. Accordingly, net inflation allowed monetary
policy to accommodate the primary inflation impulses
of transitional shocks such as corrections of
administered prices. On the other hand, this
framework allowed the central bank to react to their
secondary inflationary effects and to prevent a
spillover to price level increases.
1. 3 Implementation
In December 1997, the CNB defined its
inflation targets in terms of net inflation with the aim
of excluding transitional price shocks such as price
corrections (sometimes also called price deregulation)
and changes in taxes. The net inflation index was
calculated backwards for the purposes of inflation
targeting by the Czech Statistical Office. The
consumer basket defined for the purposes of the CPI
was adjusted for items with regulated prices and
prices affected by other administrative measures.
According to this definition, the net inflation index
represents approximately 82% of the consumer price
index (it covers 663 of the 754 price items).
The list of items excluded from the total
consumer price index was as follows: (i) prices
regulated by the Ministry of Finance (e.g. electricity)
and prices regulated by local authorities (e.g. taxis) -
weight in CPI, 7.4%, (ii) items with semi-regulated
prices (e.g. postal service) - weight in CPI, 6% (iii)
fees (e.g. TV and radio fees) - weight in CPI, 4.4%. It
is worth noting that the index of net inflation can
change from year to year due to this definition if there
is a change in government strategy. For example, in
1997 taxis became a sector regulated by local
authorities. Hence, the prices of taxis were excluded
from the net inflation index.
In the next step, the growth rate was
calculated for this reduced index and the inflation rate
was modified in order to exclude the impact of25
changes in indirect taxes (e.g. tobacco tax) or the
impact of changes in subsidies. This means that items
whose prices change due to tax changes remained a
part of the net inflation index, however, the influence
of tax changes was eliminated from net inflation.
Graph 4 shows the values of three inflation indicators
– net inflation, CPI inflation and inflation in the
segment of regulated prices. Data for the period of
1995-1997 were available at the time of introducing
inflation targeting. It is interesting to note that the
pattern of dynamics had changed quite dramatically
over time. In 1995, net inflation exceeded CPI
inflation due to nearly zero price corrections. On the
contrary, the weight of price corrections in CPI
inflation was exceptional in the second half of 1997,
therefore causing CPI inflation to exceed net inflation.

















































































































































Inflation in Segment of Regulated Prices Net Inflation CPI Inflation
Note: Net inflation and CPI inflation are scaled on the left axis (%). Inflation in the segment of regulated prices
is a complementary indicator to net inflation with respect to CPI inflation. This is scaled on the right axis. The
shaded area shows information which was not available at the time of introducing inflation targeting.
When introducing inflation targeting, the
CNB worked with two time horizons. It was not
possible to announce a target only in the form of the
defined price stability (e.g. 2% inflation with 1%
bands) since the economy was on its disinflationary
path. Hence, the “key” target was announced for the
medium-term: net inflation 3.5–5.5% by the end of
2000. The centre of the targeted interval was specified
to guarantee the convergence of net inflation to
European inflation before the Czech Republic’s entry
into the EU. The three year horizon reflected time lags
in monetary transmission. The short-term target was
announced for the end of 1998: net inflation 5.5–
6.5%. This was declared as an “orientation target” that
was derived from the medium-term disinflation
trajectory. It provided a nominal anchor for economic
contracts, the horizon of which usually did not exceed
one year. These contracts were linked to previously
published annual inflation forecasts.
During the first months of inflation targeting,
the CNB explained the strategy of its decision-making
process at several press conferences and also via press
releases. It has been declared that achieving the net
inflation targets will be the ultimate criterion for
monetary policy decisions. Decisions will be taken on
an ex ante basis when analysing the conditional
inflation outlooks and comparing them to targeted
intervals. The methods of obtaining inflation outlooks26
have been described. The CNB would evaluate both
sets of economic indicators
5 as well as rely on model
simulations. The following decision scheme was
specified: should the inflation outlook deviate from
the inflation target, an adjustment of the operational
target (repo rate) will be considered.
Inflation targeting has been reflected in the
CNB’s approach to the general public. In order to
increase transparency, the CNB has started
publicising the minutes of the board meetings on
internet two weeks after a meeting is held with a
fairly detailed description of the discussion as well as
the reasoning behind monetary policy decisions. At
the end of the quarter, the CNB started producing
inflation reports that focus on price and monetary
developments, inform about real economy and
external sector developments and include an inflation
outlook together with an explanation of monetary
measures.
2 The Decision-Making Process:
January–July 1998
Let us now describe the decision-making
process in the first seven months of inflation targeting
in the Czech Republic. Following this, we will
summarise some important features of the process.
Our source of information has been the Minutes of the
Board Meetings on monetary policy issues. The
minutes are officially publicised each month, two
weeks after the meeting is held.
                                                
5 A set of indicators is formulated in such a way as to cover
the main components of inflationary influences, i.e. demand
and cost factors, as well as factors related to inflation
expectations. The set of indicators includes: specific
consumer price indices which cover various items of
inflation and indicate inflation expectations; producer price
indices indicating cost-related inflationary pressure;
exchange rate indices; a complex of indicators
characterising monetary development, specifically monetary
aggregates and interest rates; a group of indicators
expressing the mutual relationship between supply and
demand (from which it will be possible to derive demand
pressures); indicators of labour market and wage
development.
In January 1998, the repo rate was left
unchanged. During the first month of inflation
targeting, the majority of available information was
from December. Despite numerous uncertainties, the
inflation outlook was in compliance with the inflation
target for the end of 1998. However, a high trade
deficit in December and the consequences of the
Asian crisis were viewed as a potential impulse for
weakening the exchange rate. Also, the January price
deregulation together with the expected consequences
of regular January re-pricing increased the probability
that the inflation outlook would be closer to the upper
limit of the targeted interval. It was evident that in the
first months of 1998, net inflation would increase due
to past developments.
In February, the repo rate was again
unchanged. However, this time there were two
alternatives considered (the other being to raise the
repo rate). On the one hand, in this month, the
inflation outlook started signalling that net inflation
would be in the upper part of the targeted interval by
the end of 1998.  On the other, an agreement was
reached that the decision on raising the repo rate
should not be based on the unexpectedly high month-
on-month increase in prices. The inflation outlook
was modified upwards due to the previously
underestimated scope of both the January re-pricing
effect and the impact of deregulation on net inflation.
An implication for future monetary policy decisions
was that inflation expectations should be considered
as a very important transmission channel and that
there could be increased probability of their
acceleration.
In March, by a majority vote, the repo rate
was increased by 0.25% to 15%. The newly available
February data on inflation confirmed that the risks of
higher inflation in the future might outweigh the
favourable trends in the economy. Various price
indices signalled that without an adequate policy
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response, net inflation might exceed the upper limit of
the targeted interval in December 1998. Moreover, the
available CPI forecasts for the end of 1998
(announced by various institutions) suggested that
targeted net inflation should be in the middle of this
interval rather than approaching its upper band in
order to compensate for the higher than expected CPI
inflation. The hypothesis of the potential for
accelerating expectations formulated during a
previous meeting was confirmed by the upward slope
of the interest yield curve. According to the slope,
inflation expectations exceeded the targeted values. It
was said during the discussion that, although the
observed exchange rate development supported a
gradual reduction in inflation, it would not be
desirable to shift the weight of the monetary
transmission mechanism from an interest rate channel
to an exchange rate channel. Consequently, the
modest repo rate increase was mainly designed to
affect the economy via the expectation channel.
In April, the repo rate remained unchanged.
The inflation outlook for net inflation at the end of
1998 had moved back to the targeted interval. There
was new information on the reduction of annualised
trade and current account deficits as well as the
closing of the gap between productivity and wage
increases that was accompanied with the appreciation
of the koruna. Also, imported deflation of input prices
was reflected in domestic inflation development. At
the same time, inflation expectations started
decelerating.
In May, the repo rate had again remained
unchanged. Similarly to the previous month, the
newly available information was favourable. The
inflation outlook was in accordance with the targeted
interval for the end of 1998. However, it was agreed
that to some extent this was the result of external
factors. Firstly, the part of slower inflation was
imported via input prices (mainly raw materials) that
were purely exogenous. Secondly, the situation on
both domestic and international financial markets
caused the koruna to appreciate. On the one hand, this
was partially an endogenous process linked to
improving the domestic economic fundamentals. On
the other hand, this was a consequence of exogenous
factors since crises on some emerging markets made
the koruna relatively more attractive to foreign
investors. Since the above-listed external factors were
viewed as temporary, this exogenous slowed-down in
inflation was called “borrowed disinflation”.
In July, the repo rate was cut from 15% to
14.5%. According to the inflation outlook, net
inflation was likely to be close to the lower band of
the targeted interval by the end of 1998. The newly
set repo rate was consistent with the medium-term
target for 2000. It was stressed that the latest koruna
appreciation was not a reason for cutting rates and
that the exchange rate would not be directly affected
by this monetary policy decision. The economic
situation was characterised by a lower risk premium
and a fall in inflation expectations. These were likely
to slowly decelerate because of “borrowed
disinflation”. Also, one of the main factors – the
impact of price deregulation – would have a different
impact in July from the one in January since the
composition of prices that were subject to changes
was different and the impact on net inflation would be
smaller due to an income effect.
After describing the decision-making
process, the main features can then be summarised.
First, all decisions were discussed strictly in the
framework of inflation targeting. There was no
conflict of targets revealed during the discussions.
The repo rate’s level was clearly linked to the
inflation target and the inflation outlook. When the
inflation outlook signalled a deviation of net inflation
from the targeted interval at the end of 1998, the repo
rate was changed. It is interesting to note that
decisions were symmetrical since the repo rate was
increased when the outlook signalled overshooting of28
the targeted interval and cut when the outlook
signalled undershooting.
Secondly, three periods of the introduction of
inflation targeting can be identified. Until March,
although the economic fundamentals such as the trade
deficit or consumption improved, inflation
expectations were not in line with the disinflationary
path due to the backward-looking approach as well as
to the re-pricing effect, the secondary impact of
deregulation and increased exchange rate uncertainty.
Up until July, the situation stabilised as expectations
were formed more by economic fundamentals. Since
July, expectations have been on a disinflationary path
to some extent due to the impact of external factors.
Thirdly, it is important to note that the time horizon of
the decision-making process did not change, because
the weight of the targeted interval for the medium-
term had increased gradually. At the same time, the
uncertainty linked with external factors forming
inflation increased. The problem of “borrowed
disinflation” that helped in forming inflation
expectations gained importance since external factors
could be reversed in the medium-term and destabilise
expectations once again.
3 Is a Transitional Country a “Good” Inflation
Targeter?
The Czech Republic was the first economy in
transition to adopt a regime of inflation targeting as
the explicit framework for its monetary policy. Two
important questions therefore arise. First, in the Czech
case, do underlying conditions which still have
specific features of transition allow for the effective
implementation of inflation targeting? Second, what
are the possible reactions to some transitional
challenges within the framework of inflation
targeting?
3.1 The Necessary Conditions for Effective
Implementation
The first important issue is the emphasis that society
puts on price and currency stability. If the priority of
stability is high, the central bank’s strategy as a whole
is supported. The Czech experience suggests that the
koruna has enjoyed remarkable stability in the course
of past developments. After World War I, the
currency of the newly formed Czechoslovak Republic
was the only one in the region which had avoided
hyperinflation. The relatively modest monetary
overhang was a favourable feature of the
macroeconomic situation also in the post World War
II era. And again, since the start of transition, unlike
most other countries in the region which sooner or
later adjusted their framework to the requirements of
external balance and external competitiveness
6, the
priority attached to domestic price stability has
remained a distinguishing feature of the Czech
transitional strategy
7.
The conclusion follows that price and
currency stability are highly respected and supported
by society, and therefore have been “built into” Czech
economic development and policies. This seems to be
the underlying factor which is of utmost importance
for the feasibility and sustainability of the inflation
targeting regime in the Czech case. In situations
where acceleration of economic activity and the
disinflation process are discussed in terms of a short-
run trade-off issue, the arguments of price stability
can find public support.
                                                
6 For example, Hungary and Poland used crawling-peg
regimes. Under this scheme, the objective of monetary
policy is not unambiguous since the process of disinflation
can conflict with the external balance.
7 Two types of nominal anchors were drawn upon in the
course of the transition years in order to affect domestic
stability. In the initial stages, this was the exchange rate
nominal anchor. Despite persistent real appreciation, the
koruna peg to the basket was maintained with unchanged
central parity and the horizontal band over the whole period
of January 1991 to May 1997. In the aftermath of exchange
rate turbulence, the priority of domestic stability continued
via the adoption of inflation targeting.29
The second important factor is the
institutional and economic pre-conditions of the
inflation targeting regime. The first institutional
requirement to be satisfied was evidently the
capability of the central bank to conduct its monetary
policy with a fairly high degree of independence. This
pre-condition for the adoption of inflation targeting
was, without a doubt, in place. According to the
Constitution and central bank law, the Czech National
Bank (CNB) is independent of the government and
has sole responsibility for the conduct of monetary
policy. And even more importantly, in the course of
the entire transition, this independence was put into
practice and demonstrated in the domain of both
instruments and goals.
The second prerequisite, related to the real
independence of the central bank, was fiscal
discipline. With extensive public borrowing from the
banking system (involving substantial increases in
public debt, with shallow financial markets not being
able to absorb the placement of debt instruments and
high dependence on revenues from seigniorage),
monetary policy would not be in a position to secure
the meeting of disinflation targets. In this type of
situation inflationary pressures of a fiscal origin
would develop, the effectiveness of policies for
attaining nominal targets would be undermined, and
the central bank would be forced to follow an
increasingly accommodative monetary policy. In the
case of the Czech economy, the principle of a
balanced budget policy was followed throughout the
past period, and the public sector borrowing
requirement remained moderate. Nevertheless, the
revealed “hidden debt” of transformation institutions
inflated the previous officially declared debt level.
There are other institutional factors that relate to the
issue of inflation targeting. Specifically, a certain
level in the development of financial markets is
required. With a floating exchange rate, there is a
need for a well-developed foreign exchange market
that is complex enough to cushion the short-term
volatility of capital flows. Also, instruments reducing
exchange rate uncertainty should be available to
economic agents. Moreover, if inflation targeting is
introduced before major changes on financial markets
take place, extensive structural breaks would make it
difficult to create inflation forecasts or outlooks. Last
but not least, it is very important that at the initial
stage of introducing the strategy, external factors such
as import prices do not damage the credibility of the
new framework via significant shock. In the Czech
case, the external factors sent favourable impulses and
helped set inflation expectations on the disinflationary
path.
3.2 Inflation Targeting as a Disinflation Strategy
The Czech approach to inflation targeting has
been influenced by the necessity to distinguish
between the long-term objective in the form of price
stability and the medium-term target of disinflation.
Obviously, no threshold inflation rate could be
defined as a prerequisite for a viable shift to inflation
targeting. Nevertheless, the experience from other
countries suggested that this regime had not been
introduced in times of high or moderate inflation.
Moreover, most countries switched to inflation
targeting only after inflation was under control and on
a decreasing path. As a rule, the CPI index had one-
digit values and in the majority of cases, the central
bank was faced with the problem of reducing inflation
fluctuations rather than the problem of disinflation.
In the Czech case, the inflation level fluctuated
around ten per cent
8 with some inertia for several
consecutive years. This level, though moderate, was
higher than in other countries when shifting to
                                                
8 There were three detectable inflation episodes. In 1993,
the inflation impulse was created by the VAT reform. In
1995, the impact of capital inflow on demand started to
affect inflation. In 1997, the exchange rate turbulence and
the consequent depreciation of the koruna were significant
factors in the development of inflation.30
inflation targeting. Moreover, an acceleration of the
inflation rate was envisaged for the first months of
1998, and market expectations for the future rate of
inflation seemed quite unstable with little confidence
from the public that the disinflation process would be
reinstituted in the foreseeable future.
Under these circumstances, despite an
unfavourable outlook or rather, because of that
outlook, the CNB Board did not want to wait to take a
clear stand on price stability as the main objective of
monetary policy. The public commitment to the
explicit disinflation target and the related resolute
policy stance were aimed at reversing expectations
and at reassuring the markets and the public. Given
the situation of increased political uncertainty,
highlighted by the resignation of the government, the
independent central bank commitment to sound,
transparent long-term goals seemed to be of utmost
importance, irrespective of the potential swings in
political power.
The design of inflation targets has reflected
the above-analysed problems. In December, the
public announcement of switching to inflation
targeting reassured the public that monetary policy is
devoted to providing price stability. By specifying the
two targets for the short-term and medium-term
horizon, the CNB also declared that monetary policy
will aim at disinflation in a horizon that is relevant for
negotiated contracts. This made the objective of price
stability more “actual” since previous strategies did
not declare any time horizon for reaching the
European level of inflation. Hence, the channel of
inflation expectations through which monetary policy
affects economic decisions has become more
efficient. Moreover, the new strategy probably
changed as well the mode in which expectations are
formed, from an adaptive mode to one that was more
forward-looking. This has been a very important
achievement. Should wages be negotiated under a
strictly backward-looking mode of expectations, the
costs of disinflation would be much higher and the
risk of reappearance of the external imbalance would
increase.
3.3 Transitional Challenges
The Czech experience in the first eight
months of inflation targeting revealed two important
challenges for policy makers. It has been necessary to
deal with transitional shocks to prices and the
consequences of having an emerging financial market.
Let us describe the problem of price shocks first since
it enters both the decision-making process as well as
the process of target specification. Countries that are
inflation targeters usually deal with the problem of
price shocks by modifying the CPI index or by
declaring “caveats”. Central banks do not commit
themselves to influencing CPI inflation as a whole.
Both methods are used to distinguish inflation from
primary exogenous shocks to prices in order to avoid
a counter-productive reaction of monetary policy.
During transition, this problem is more
complex since this reform carries with it a sequence
of exogenous price shocks such as tax reform or the
so-called deregulation scheme in which relative prices
in previously regulated sectors are gradually
corrected. As a result, there is a trade-off for policy
makers. On the one hand, if the CPI index is modified
in order to minimise the risk of a counter-productive
reaction of monetary policy or the risk of missing the
target, it is necessary to add to standard caveats the
expected transitional shocks during transition. In this
case, the new index used for specification of the target
could become irrelevant to economic decisions since
the share of excluded categories is high and CPI
inflation might diverge from the targeted inflation
9.
                                                
9 As was shown in Graph 4, two types of divergence are
possible. During a period of small-scale deregulation, in
which inflation in the segment of regulated prices was lower
than inflation in the remaining price segments, net inflation
exceeded CPI inflation. Large-scale deregulation caused the
CPI to exceed net inflation. Since the scheme of
deregulation was usually announced on an annual basis and31
Consequently, the transmission channel through
expectations is significantly weakened.
On the other hand, if only standard caveats
are used, the targeted inflation is more likely to
converge to CPI inflation and contracts would be
linked to the target. However, during transition the
excluded shocks would be quite significant as shown
in Graph 4. Consequently, there would be three
possible reactions of monetary policy: (i) to
compromise on the slope of the disinflationary path
and derive its slope from a deregulation scheme with
all the disadvantages (e.g. large fluctuations around
the disinflation trend caused by changes in
government strategy), (ii) to compromise on the
credibility of the target itself and allow for missing it
in the case of large-scale deregulation, (iii) to rely on
the substitution effect between regulated and non-
regulated price segments and to accept the costs of
non-accommodated supply price shocks.
In the Czech case, the first alternative has
been evaluated as less costly. However, the CNB did
not use many caveats explicitly when defining net
inflation, because net inflation filters out some
standard shocks such as the impact of indirect taxes.
The majority of excluded items are those in the
segment of regulated prices. Hence, one can classify
net inflation as a “transitional” concept, and it is
likely that in the medium-term, after major
deregulation steps are completed, the two inflation
rates would converge. Not only is the existence of a
deregulation scheme and implied uncertainty a
limiting factor when defining the target, it has
consequences for the decision-making process as
well.  As the summary of the minutes of the meeting
shows, it has been very difficult to predict the
spillover effect from the segment of regulated prices
                                                                         
was conditioned with political stability, there has been
uncertainty for both the scope and the direction of the
divergence. Moreover, the index of net inflation itself is
subject to uncertainty since the government can
theoretically redefine the segment of regulated prices
significantly.
to net inflation due to the unavailability of historical
data as well as structural breaks.
The second important challenge for policy
makers has been the problem of the existence of
emerging financial markets. It is important to note
that in the Czech case, the pegged exchange rate
played the role of a nominal anchor for the entire
period of 1990–1997. In May 1997, the peg was
discontinued, and a more flexible regime in the form
of managed floating was introduced. This shift was
consistent with the requirements of the inflation
targeting regime since it is feasible to target domestic
inflation only in the context of a flexible exchange
rate, otherwise conflicts of commitments to different
targeted variables are likely to arise and the
effectiveness of inflation targeting is undermined.
The shift to a floating exchange rate
notwithstanding, the policy approach to the role of the
exchange rate in the new setting remained an issue.
Given the small size and the significant openness of
the Czech economy, the exchange rate has had a
remarkably large and direct impact on the CPI. At the
same time, capital flows, much larger and more
volatile than trade flows, have increasingly dominated
short-term exchange rate developments. Moreover, in
a transition economy with still relatively thin markets,
wide interest rate differentials and a volatile risk
premium, the exchange rate response to various
shocks, new economic and political data and to
changing perceptions of investors is much more
volatile and occasionally even erratic in nature. In the
given circumstances, some issues related to the
exchange rate within the framework of inflation
targeting required clarification – for example, policy
stance.
On the one hand, the level of the exchange
rate can neither be an explicit nor implicit objective of
monetary policy. This is because the control of the
exchange rate level is neither feasible in the existing
conditions nor consistent with the inflation targeting32
framework. Accordingly, problems of external
imbalances must be coped with within a broader
framework of macroeconomic policies and their
combination. The foreign exchange interventions aim
at smoothing the moves from one exchange rate level
to another and at reducing the volatility and erratic
responses in the exposed but still relatively thin
koruna foreign exchange market. On the other hand,
for a small, open economy, movements in the
exchange rate are a significant factor that enters the
decision-making process of the central bank.
Subsequently, foreign investors tend to guess the
reaction function of the central bank and use the
implicit bands to reduce foreign exchange risk when
speculating on the foreign exchange market.
3.4 Transparency Gain
An important advantage of the shift to
inflation targeting was related to the increased
transparency of monetary policy. Transparency, in
fact, has improved in both specifying the target and
decision-making. As far as target specification is
concerned, the adoption of an inflation targeting
regime introduced a clear-cut focus for monetary
policy. It has been a move from ambiguous
specification of the disinflationary path to explicit
specification of the slope of the path as well as the
time horizons.
  Moreover, in comparison to the previous
situation with two parallel intermediary targets and
non-binding inflation forecasts, the potential conflict
of criteria that could emerge as a result of various
imbalances has been removed. For example, when
using two parallel intermediate targets in periods of
capital inflow, it was not easy to determine which
target should gain more importance in the decision-
making process. Excessive monetary growth and an
excessive current account deficit put monetary policy
into a position in which only one parallel target could
be achieved. With the inflation target, the importance
of various indicators has been unambiguously
(although implicitly) determined by their weight in
the transmission scheme from interest rate to inflation
outlook.
The second important improvement has been
an increase in the transparency of the decision-making
process itself. The policy steps of the central bank
have become smoother and more predictable since
with a clearly defined scheme of targets and
instruments, the policy rule was now unambiguous.
Also, the decision-making process was made
transparent due to publicising the minutes of the
meetings. By the same token, this process is more
exposed to the reactions of professional economists
and the general public.
This gained transparency and accountability
of monetary policy proved to be beneficial. It has had
a positive impact on staff efforts and performance
within the bank. It has contributed as well to a better
understanding of the problem and to increased and
more diversified public involvement. Also, it
provided a clear framework for discussions about
monetary policy since the target has been defined
clearly and the commitment to ensuring disinflation
has been explicit. There has been no conflict with
other targets such as the external balance. One of the
most important benefits has been the successful
formation of expectations that have reduced the costs
of the disinflation process. Also, an increase in the
credibility of monetary policy has reduced the costs of
external financing due to lowered risk premium.33
Many foreign institutions have looked upon the new
strategy as a real achievement. For example,
the OECD report states:
Globally, monetary policy has successfully negotiated a very difficult period. The decision
to abandon the fixed-exchange rate regime was made before too many reserves had been
spent and the Central Bank has managed to use the subsequent period to partially restock
them. Although subject to volatility emanating from the developments in Asia, there have
been no precipitous falls in the currency since the spring 1997 crisis and the depreciation
observed in recent months appears to be in line with economic fundamentals.
Appropriately, given the still large trade and current account deficits, monetary policy has
remained restrictive, while the announcement of a new inflation-targeting framework
brought a welcome end to a period of uncertainty as to the main focus of policy.
Appendix: Basic Indicators
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M1 = currency + demand deposits
M2 = M1 + CZK time deposits + foreign currency deposits
L   = M2 + T-bills + CNB bills + NPF bills in the portfolios of domestic non-banking subjects 
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